C[omp]ute

From: "andrew cooke" <andrew@...>

Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2004 09:26:01 -0400 (CLT)

From /. - http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/08/17/0030243

For SHA0, seems that, like DES iirc, the NSA fixed up SHA (from 0 to 1). 
SHA0 was proven weak in 98 and the attack has finally been implemented in
some way (a collision?).

The MD5 (and other less used algorithms) work contains an error,
apparently (wrong IV values -
http://www.rtfm.com/movabletype/archives/2004_08.html#001053 ), but they
don't seem to be critical to the process (wasn't MD5 suspected weak too?).
 Again, it's a collision - http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/199.pdf

Andrew

-- 
` __ _ __ ___  ___| |_____   work web site: http://www.ctio.noao.edu/~andrew
 / _` / _/ _ \/ _ \ / / -_)  personal web site: http://www.acooke.org
 \__,_\__\___/\___/_\_\___|  list: http://www.acooke.org/andrew/compute.html


_______________________________________________
compute mailing list
compute@...
https://200.30.249.238/mailman/listinfo/compute