C[omp]ute

From: andrew cooke <andrew@...>

Date: Sun, 18 Oct 2015 10:39:52 -0300

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a
simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication
licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no
bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of
bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages
to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to
avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the
licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments.

http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2000-2004/00jre-collusive-bidding-lessons.pdf

Scroll down to the details of how it's done - gets quite complex.

Andrew