C[omp]ute

From: "andrew cooke" <andrew@...>

Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2004 18:50:03 -0300 (CLST)

http://www.xelerance.com/mirror/otr/

Encryption
    No one else can read your instant messages.
Authentication
    You are assured the correspondent is who you think it is.
Deniability
    The messages you send do not have digital signatures that are
checkable by a third party. Anyone can forge messages after a
conversation to make them look like they came from you. However,
during a conversation, your correspondent is assured the messages he
sees are authentic and unmodified.
Perfect forward secrecy
    If you lose control of your private keys, no previous conversation is
compromised.

(I've not thought much, but it strikes me that isn't so difficult - isn't
it equivalent to sending messages over an authenticated SSL connection? 
Hmmm.  Except for the perfect forwads secrecy....?)

From /. - http://it.slashdot.org/it/04/12/16/1946216.shtml?tid=93

Andrew

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